março 21, 2012
março 18, 2012
Limites e Influências
Por João Neto às 06:49 0 comentário(s)
março 15, 2012
Definições e Abusos
Por João Neto às 15:38 0 comentário(s)
março 12, 2012
Atribuição
Por João Neto às 07:26 0 comentário(s)
março 08, 2012
Tainter - The collapse of complex societies IV
[...]
Collapse occurs, and can only occur, in a power vacuum. Collapse is possible only where there is no competitor strong enough to fill the political vacuum of disintegration. Where such a competitor does exist there can be no collapse, for the competitor will expand territorially to administer the population left leaderless. Collapse is not the same thing as change of regime. Where peer polities interact collapse will affect all equally, and when it occurs, provided that no outside competitor is powerful enough to absorb all. [...] there are major differences between the current and the ancient worlds that have important implications for collapse. One of these is that the world today is full. That is to say, it is filled by complex societies; these occupy every sector of the globe, except the most desolate. This is a new factor in human history. Complex societies as a whole are a recent and unusual aspect of human life. The current situation, where all societies are so oddly constituted, is unique. [...] There are no power vacuums left today. Every nation is linked to, and influenced by, the major powers, and most are strongly linked with one power bloc or the other. [...] Collapse, if and when it comes again, will this time be global. No longer can any individual nation collapse. World civilization will disintegrate as a whole. Competitors who evolve as peers collapse in like manner.
Por João Neto às 07:53 0 comentário(s)
março 05, 2012
Tainter - The collapse of complex societies III
Rulers [...] must constantly legitimize their reigns. Legitimizing activities include such things as external defense and internal order, alleviating the effects of local productivity fluctuations, undertaking local development projects, and providing food and entertainment (as in Imperial Rome) for urban masses. In many cases the productivity of these legitimizing investments will decline. Whatever activities a hierarchy undertakes initially to bond a population to itself (providing defense, agricultural development, public works, bread and circuses, and the like) often thereafter become de rigueur, so that further bonding activities are at higher cost, with little or no additional benefit to the hierarchy. [...] The alternative course is to reduce legitimizing activities and increase other means of behavioral control. Yet in such situations, as resources committed to benefits decline, resources committed to control must increase. Although quantitative cost/beneft data for such control systems are rare, it seems reasonable to infer that as the costs of coercion increase, the benefits (in the form of population compliance) probably do not grow proportionately [...] These remarks are not meant to suggest that social evolution carries no benefits, nor that the marginal product of social complexity always declines. The marginal product of any investment declines only after a certain point; prior to that point benefits increase faster than costs. Very often, though, societies do reach a level where continued investment in complexity yields a declining marginal return. At that point the society is investing heavily in an evolutionary course that is becoming less and less productive, where at increased cost it is able to do little more than maintain the status quo.
[...]
For human societies, the best key to continued socioeconomic growth, and to avoiding or circumventing (or at least financing) declines in marginal productivity, is to obtain a new energy subsidy when it becomes apparent that marginal productivity is beginning to drop. Among modern societies this has been accomplished by tapping fossil fuel reserves and the atom. Among societies without the technical springboard necessary for such development, the usual temptation is to acquire an energy subsidy through territorial expansion.
Por João Neto às 07:26 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 29, 2012
Tainter - The collapse of complex societies II
Por João Neto às 08:41 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 27, 2012
Tainter - The collapse of complex societies I
Legitimacy is the belief of the populace and the elites that rule is proper and valid, that the political world is as it should be. It pertains to individual rulers, to decisions, to broad policies, to parties, and to entire forms of government. The support that members are willing to extend to a political system is essential for its survival. Decline in support will not necessarily lead to the fall of a regime, for to a certain extent coercion can replace commitment to ensure compliance. Coercion, though, is a costly, ineffective strategy which can never be completely or permanently successful. Even with coercion, decline in popular support below some critical minimum leads infallibly to political failure. Establishing moral validity is a less costly and more effective approach.
Por João Neto às 15:35 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 20, 2012
Nacionalismo
Por João Neto às 19:06 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 16, 2012
Falácia de Projecção Mental
neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought (pg.11).
"There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature."
Por João Neto às 08:02 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 13, 2012
Adaptação
Por João Neto às 21:50 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 06, 2012
Perfeito, Imperfeito
Por João Neto às 07:04 0 comentário(s)
fevereiro 02, 2012
Distância
Por João Neto às 08:19 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 30, 2012
Evidências II

Por João Neto às 07:27 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 26, 2012
Políticas
Por João Neto às 21:54 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 23, 2012
The Moon Is A Harsh Mistress (2/2)
"Distrust the obvious, suspect the traditional . . . for in the past mankind has not done well when saddling itself with governments. For example, I note in one draft report a proposal for setting up a commission to divide Luna into congressional districts and to reapportion them from time to time according to population.
"This is the traditional way; therefore it should be suspect, considered guilty until proved innocent. Perhaps you feel that this is the only way. May I suggest others? Surely where a man lives is the least important thing about him. Constituencies might be formed by dividing people by occupation. . . or by age. . . or even alphabetically. Or they might not be divided, every member elected at large---and do not object that this would make it impossible for any man not widely known throughout Luna to be elected; that might be the best possible thing for Luna.
"You might even consider installing the candidates who receive the least number of votes; unpopular men may be just the sort to save you from a new tyranny. Don't reject the idea merely because it seems preposterous--think about it! In past history popularly elected governments have been no better and sometimes far worse than overt tyrannies.
"But if representative government turns out to be your intention there still may be ways to achieve it better than the territorial district. For example you each represent about ten thousand human beings, perhaps seven thousand of voting age--and some of you were elected by slim majorities. Suppose instead of election a man were qualified for office by petition signed by four thousand citizens. He would then represent those four thousand affirmatively, with no disgruntled minority, for what would have been a minority in a territorial constituency would all be free to start other petitions or join in them. All would then be represented by men of their choice. Or a man with eight thousand supporters might have two votes in this body. Difficulties, objections, practical points to be worked out--many of them! But you could work them out. . . and thereby avoid the chronic sickness of representative government, the disgruntled minority which feels--correctly!--that it has been disenfranchised.
"But, whatever you do, do not let the past be a straitjacket!
"I note one proposal to make this Congress a two-house body. Excellent--the more impediments to legislation the better. But, instead of following tradition, I suggest one house legislators, another whose single duty is to repeal laws. Let legislators pass laws only with a two-thirds majority . . . while the repealers are able to cancel any law through a mere one-third minority. Preposterous? Think about it. If a bill is so poor that it cannot command two-thirds of your consents, is it not likely that it would make a poor law? And if a law is disliked by as many as one-third is it not likely that you would be better off without it?
"But in writing your constitution let me invite attention the wonderful virtues of the negative! Accentuate the negative! Let your document be studded with things the government is forever forbidden to do. No conscript armies . . . no interference however slight with freedom of press, or speech, or travel, or assembly, or of religion, or of instruction, or communication, or occupation. . . no involuntary taxation. Comrades, if you were to spend five years in a study of history while thinking of more and more things that your governinen should promise never to do and then let your constitution be nothing but those negatives, I would not fear the outcome.
"What I fear most are affirmative actions of sober and well-intentioned men, granting to government powers to do something that appears to need doing."
Por João Neto às 06:41 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 19, 2012
The Moon Is A Harsh Mistress (1/2)
"Capital punishment?"
"For what?"
"Let's say for treason. Against Luna after you've freed Luna."
"Treason how? Unless I knew the circumstances I could not decide."
"Nor could I, dear Wyoming. But I believe in capital punishment under some circumstances. . . with this difference. I would not ask a court; I would try, condemn, execute sentence myself, and accept full responsibility."
"But--Professor, what are your political beliefs?"
"I'm a rational anarchist."
"I don't know that brand. Anarchist individualist, anarchist Communist, Christian anarchist, philosophical anarchist, syndicalist, libertarian--those I know. But what's this? Randite?"
"I can get along with a Randite. A rational anarchist believes that concepts such as 'state' and 'society' and 'government' have no existence save as physically exemplified in the acts of self-responsible individuals. He believes that it is impossible to shift blame, share blame, distribute blame. . . as blame, guilt, responsibility are matters taking place inside human beings singly and nowhere else. But being rational, he knows that not all individuals hold his evaluations, so he tries to live perfectly in an imperfect world. . . aware that his effort will be less than perfect yet undismayed by self-knowledge of self-failure."
Robert A. Heinlein - The Moon Is A Harsh Mistress
Por João Neto às 19:39 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 17, 2012
Separação
Por João Neto às 06:30 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 16, 2012
Alegoria
Por João Neto às 07:37 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 12, 2012
Áreas de Influência
Por João Neto às 08:35 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 09, 2012
Modelos
Por João Neto às 08:25 0 comentário(s)
janeiro 06, 2012
janeiro 03, 2012
Esvaziamento
- A liberdade é a possibilidade de termos disponíveis mais escolhas e de agirmos de acordo com a nossa escolha preferencial. Isso não depende do mundo ser determinista: uma pessoa tem opções e age segundo elas, seja o processo de decisão determinista ou não (aliás, um processo demasiado não determinista seria, este sim, uma ameaça a regras sociais estáveis);
- A responsabilidade é um conceito social. Ela é julgada moral e socialmente de acordo com as regras da sociedade em questão. E mais uma vez, isso não depende da natureza ontológica do mundo externo. Depende sim dos diversos modelos - sociais, científicos, éticos, religiosos - que a sociedade partilha e utiliza no seu dia-a-dia. É natural que novo conhecimento seja incorporado na sociedade e altere a sua perspectiva, como a moderna noção de inimputabilidade de certos doentes mentais. Mas, em última análise, as sociedades têm de ser capazes de manter um mecanismo coerente e sustentável de responsabilidade individual, qualquer que seja o conhecimento adquirido. A justiça, tradicionalmente o corpo social que formaliza e gere conflitos de responsabilidade, é um corpo independente. Ela recebe ajuda da ética, da ciência e da lógica, mas não depende delas para se fundar e funcionar.
Por João Neto às 21:05 0 comentário(s)
dezembro 28, 2011
dezembro 27, 2011
Identidade e anonimato
Por João Neto às 08:55 0 comentário(s)
dezembro 22, 2011
Selecção Natural
In its most general form, natural selection must choose between alternative replicators. A replicator is a piece of coded information that makes exact copies of itself, along with occasional inexact copies or 'mutations'. The point about this is the Darwinian one. Those varieties of replicator that happen to be good at getting copied become more numerous at the expense of alternative replicators that are bad at getting copied. That, at its most rudimentary, is natural selection. The archetypal replicator is a gene, a stretch of DNA that is duplicated, nearly always with extreme accuracy, through an indefinite number of generations. [...] In the world of genes, the occasional flaws in replication (mutations) see to it that the gene pool contains alternative variants of any given gene - 'alleles' - which may therefore be seen as competing with each other. Competing for what? For the particular chromosomal slot or 'locus' that belongs to that set of alleles. And how do they compete? Not by direct molecule-to-molecule combat but by proxy. The proxies are their 'phenotypic traits' - things like length or fur colour: manifestations of genes fleshed out as anatomy, physiology, biochemistry or behaviour. A gene's fate is normally bound up with the bodies in which it successively sits. To the extent that it influences those bodies, it affects its own chances of surviving in the gene pool. As the generations go by, genes increase or decrease in frequency in the gene pool by virtue of their phenotypic proxies.
[...]
For didactic purposes, I treated genes as though they were isolated units, acting independently. But of course they are not independent of one another, and this fact shows itself in two ways .First, genes are linearly strung along chromosomes, and so tend to travel through generations in the company of particular other genes that occupy neighbouring chromosomal loci. [...] The other respect in which genes are not independent [...] concerns embryology which - the fact is often mis-understood - is completely distinct from genetics. Bodies are not jigsawed together as mosaics of phenotypic pieces, each one contributed by a different gene. There is no one-to-one mapping between genes and units of anatomy or behaviour. Genes 'collaborate' with hundreds of other genes in programming the developmental processes that culminate in a body, in the same kind of way as the words of a recipe collaborate in a cookery process that culminates in a dish. It is not the case that each word of the recipe corresponds to a different morsel of the dish. Genes, then, co-operate in cartels to build bodies, and that is one of the important principles of embryology. It is tempting to say that natural selection favours cartels of genes in a kind of group selection between alternative cartels. That is confusion. What really happens is that the other genes of the gene pool constitute a major part of the environment in which each gene is selected versus its alleles. Because each is selected to be successful in the presence of the others - which are also being selected in a similar way - cartels of co-operating genes emerge.
[...]
Different kinds of gene cartel emerge in different gene pools. Carnivore gene pools have genes that program prey-detecting sense organs, prey-catching claws, carnassial teeth, meat-digesting enzymes and many other genes, all fine-tuned to co-operate with each other. At the same time, in herbivore gene pools, different sets of mutually compatible genes are favoured for their co-operation with each other. We are familiar with the idea that a gene is favoured for the compatibility of its phenotype with the external environment of the species: desert, woodland or whatever it is. The point I am now making is that it is also favoured for its compatibility with the other genes of its particular gene pool. A carnivore gene would not survive in a herbivore gene pool, and vice versa. In the long gene's-eye-view, the gene pool of the species - the set of genes that are shuffled and reshuffled by sexual reproduction - constitutes the genetic environment in which each gene is selected for its capacity to co-operate.
Por João Neto às 06:32 0 comentário(s)
dezembro 19, 2011
Limitações da Lei (parte III)
Por João Neto às 08:13 0 comentário(s)
dezembro 16, 2011
Limitações da Lei (parte II)
Por João Neto às 21:10 0 comentário(s)
dezembro 12, 2011
Limitações da Lei (parte I)
Por João Neto às 21:07 0 comentário(s)


