Prioridades

O direito à propriedade é visto por John Locke como o direito natural ao seu uso e à sua defesa contra qualquer interferência imoral ou ilegal, sendo modernamente interpretada como uma liberdade negativa(*). Isto implica a existência de uma estrutura que legisle, regule e resolva conflitos relacionados, sendo legitimada, como David Hume argumentou, pela defesa deste importante direito natural. Mas o direito à propriedade actual inclui também a transferência da propriedade para terceiros. Este direito conexo, socialmente relevante, não se encaixa no domínio da não-interferência mas do privilégio, devendo ser, por isso, interpretado como liberdade positiva. A remoção deste privilégio aproximar-nos-ia da antiga noção da terra enquanto domínio público, onde cada pessoa ou família possuía um direito igualitário a uma sua porção e ao fruto do seu trabalho (muito perto, ironicamente, do slogan “a terra a quem a trabalha”). A referida estrutura, legitimada pela responsabilidade de fazer respeitar o direito natural à propriedade, ao aceitar e gerir transferências de propriedade está a aplicar o seu poder coercivo para lá do domínio natural, minando, assim, a sua própria legitimidade. Esta dificuldade é um argumento contra a prioridade máxima e não partilhada do conceito de direito natural, assumida como axioma por muitas das linhagens de pensamento liberal.

(*) Isaiah Berlin propôs a diferenciação entre liberdades negativas, i.e., direitos de não interferência, e liberdades positivas, i.e., direitos a certos benefícios.

Força

As convicções são inimigos mais perigosos da verdade do que as mentiras -- Friedrich Nietzsche

Redistribuição

Vejamos uma citação do livro de Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution (1952), sobre a questão da distribuição de rendimentos:

Our examination of the redistributionist ideal in theory and practice has led us gradually away from our initial contrast between rich and poor toward quite another contrast - that between individuals on the one hand, and the State and minor corporate bodies on the other.

Pure redistribution would merely transfer income from the richer to the poorer. This could conceivably be achieved by a simple reverse-tax or subsidy handed to the recipients of lower incomes from the proceeds of a special tax on higher incomes. But this is not the proce-dure which has prevailed. The State sets up as trustee for the lower-income group and doles out services and benefits. In order to avoid the creation of a "protected class," a discrimination fatal to political equality, the tendency has been to extend the benefits and services upward to all members of society, to cheapen food and rents for the rich as well as the poor, to assist the well-to-do in illness equally with the needy. The cost of such services has soared in England [seguem estatísticas para a Inglaterra de 1950]. In fact, the public authorities, so that they may give to all, must take from all. And from the study made by the E.C.A. mission to the United Kingdom, it appears that lower-income families taken as a whole pay more into the exchequer than they draw from it.

No caso de Portugal actual, o peso recai principalmente na classe média. Vejamos um comentário [1] de Francisco Rocha Antunes à seguinte nota do Ministério das Finanças [2] sobre o IRS de 2006:

6. Quadro 37 – Total das Declarações com IRS Liquidado por Escalões de Rendimento Número de Agregados

O total de agregados com IRS Liquidado corresponde a cerca de 46% do total de agregados com rendimento bruto declarado. Daquele total de agregados, cerca de 28% apresentam rendimentos brutos até 13.500 Euros, enquanto que 70% declararam rendimentos brutos superiores àquele montante mas inferiores a 100.000 Euros.

7. Quadro 40 – IRS por Escalões de Rendimento Bruto Valores Liquidados

Da conjugação dos quadros 31, 37 e 40 retiram-se as seguintes conclusões:

- Para mais de metade dos agregados não é apurado qualquer valor de IRS;

- Para os agregados com IRS Liquidado:

- Com rendimento bruto até 13.500€ (28%), o montante de imposto é de apenas 2,5% do valor total do IRS Liquidado em 2006;

- Com rendimento bruto entre 13.500€ e 100.000€ (70%), o montante de imposto é de 70,4% do valor total do IRS Liquidado em 2006;

- Com rendimento bruto superior a 100.000€, (2%), o montante de imposto é de 27,1% do valor total do IRS Liquidado em 2006.

Eu sei que esta coisa dos números assusta muita gente mas tem a vantagem de ser uma descrição, não uma opinião. Resumindo: de 4.371.037 agregados familiares identificados pelas Finanças em 2006, 2.360.360 não pagaram nada de IRS. Nada é mesmo isso, zero. O Estado arrecadou nesse ano 7.671.000.000 € de IRS. Do total de 2.010.677 agregados que de facto pagaram IRS, 562.990 tiveram um rendimento anual bruto até 13.500€ e pagaram 2,5 % do valor do IRS liquidado, ou seja, 340€ de IRS efectivamente entregue por agregado. No escalão dos agregados que tiveram um rendimento bruto entre 13.500€ e os 100.000€ estavam 1.407.474 famílias que pagaram, em média, 3.836€ de IRS por ano cada uma. Por fim, com um rendimento bruto superior a 100.000€, estiveram 40.213 famílias que pagaram em média, cada uma, 51.695€ de IRS nesse ano.

É por isto que não me parece que a solução seja aumentar os impostos aos que ganham mais. A redistribuição do rendimento já é maciça. [Francisco Rocha Antunes, Junho de 2009]

Mas a verdade é que continua a aumentar. Se compararmos a participação dos agregados familiares a partir de 40k€/ano (i.e., a partir de três mil euros/mês/família de rendimento bruto), em 2005 era de 69.4% do IRS colectado (para 17% dos agregados), em 2006 era 70.8% (18.4% dos agregados), em 2007 era 71.9% (19.1%), em 2008 era 73% (20.4%), subindo para os 74% em 2009 (21.4%). Ficamos à espera dos dados de 2010 e 2011 para verificar se esta tendência se mantém.

Fontes:

IRS 2005-2006

IRS 2006-2008 [cf. quadros 37 & 40]

IRS 2007-2009 [idem]

Ferramentas cognitivas

A Estatística e a Economia são disciplinas muito subvalorizadas no nosso ensino. A Estatística lida com o inevitável da evidência finita e de qualidade variável. Por exemplo, ela diz-nos que a certeza e a impossibilidade são conceitos ideais que podemos apenas aproximar. A Economia ganha a sua razão de ser porque os recursos são finitos e as decisões de os usar acarretam custos e riscos nem sempre evidentes. Por exemplo, ela diz-nos ser impossível erradicar totalmente um problema social pelos limites económicos dos ganhos decrescentes. Este tipo de ideias são importantes na educação de cidadãos aptos a usar os seus direitos económicos e políticos na consolidação de uma sociedade cívica como a nossa.

Uma causa ou um sintoma?

Excertos do prefácio de John Gray ao livro de Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution

Bertrand de Jouvenel's study in the ethics of redistribution is distinctive, in the first instance, because it focuses precisely on the morality of redistribution and not on its side effects on incentives. This is to say that de Jouvenel's critique embodies a fundamental challenge to the values expressed in redistributionist thought which in no way depends upon an instrumental or utilitarian assessment of the consequences of redistributionist policy. De Jouvenel is concerned with the impact on individual liberty and on cultural life of redistribution rather than with its effects on productivity. His study is significant for another reason, which is that he is careful to distinguish redistributionism from other, superficially similar doctrines. Thus, he shows clearly how it differs from agrarian egalitarianism, which aims to equalize a resource - land - but does not seek to control the distribution of its product. [...] De Jouvenel makes another fundamental distinction within redistributionism itself. Modern redistributionism encompasses two wholly disparate elements: the belief that government should be centrally involved in the relief of poverty, and the belief that economic inequality is itself unjust or evil. These two beliefs have indeed been conflated in the increasing acceptance of the view that it is the responsibility of government to ensure rising popular living standards. A further move in the direction of egalitarian redistributionism is taken when to the proposal that government supply a subsistence floor beneath which no one may fall is added the proposal that there be instituted a ceiling beyond which no one may rise. [...] He further notes that a policy of redistribution is bound to discriminate against minorities, since it will inevitably favor the preferences and interests of the majority [...]

For de Jouvenel, however, the most profound result of redistributionist policy is the impetus it gives to the baleful process of centralization. [...] De Jouvenel goes on to speculate that the underlying causal process may go in the opposite direction: Redistributionist policy may be an incident in a process of centralization that has acquired a momentum of its own.

Desculpas

Quantas decisões peculiares dos nossos maiores políticos, jurados, militares e outras eminências pardas são justificadas com argumentos que a realidade social é complexa, que é sempre preciso considerar inúmeros factores raramente explicitados, que foi tomada a melhor acção possível? Mas quantas destas decisões nasceram, de facto, de redes de preconceitos, favores e pressões que ligam e limitam estas pessoas do poder?

Razão e ETs

Uma citação longa, mas que vale a pena, da novela que inspirou Stalker de Andrey Tarkovskiy:

I must warn you that your question, Richard, comes under the heading of xenology. Xenology: an unnatural mixture of science fiction and formal logic. It's based on the false premise that human psychology is applicable to extraterrestrial intelligent beings."

"Why is that false?" Noonan asked.

"Because biologists have already been burned trying to use human psychology on animals. Earth animals, at that."

"Forgive me, but that's an entirely different matter. We're talking about the psychology of rational beings."

"Yes. And everything would be fine if we only knew what reason was."

"Don't we know?" Noonan was surprised.

"Believe it or not, we don't. Usually a trivial definition is used: reason is that part of man's activity that distinguishes him from the animals. You know, an attempt to distinguish the owner from the dog who understands everything but just can't speak. Actually, this trivial definition gives rise to rather more ingenious ones. Based on bitter observation of the above-mentioned human activities. For example: reason is the ability of a living creature to perform unreasonable or unnatural acts."

"Yes, that's about us, about me, and those like me," Noonan agreed bitterly.

"Unfortunately. Or how about this hypothetical definition. Reason is a complex type of instinct that has not yet formed completely. This implies that instinctual behavior is always purposeful and natural. A million years from now our instinct will have matured and we will stop making the mistakes that are probably integral to reason. And then, if something should change in the universe, we will all become extinct—precisely because we will have forgotten how to make mistakes, that is, to try various approaches not stipulated by an inflexible program of permitted alternatives."

"Somehow you make it all sound demeaning."

"All right, how about another definition—a very lofty and noble one. Reason is the ability to use the forces of the environment without destroying that environment."

Noonan grimaced and shook his head.

"No, that's not about us. How about this: 'man, as opposed to animals, is a creature with an undefinable need for knowledge'? I read that somewhere."

"So have I," said Valentine. "But the whole problem with that is that the average man—the one you have in mind when you talk about 'us' and 'not us'—very easily manages to overcome this need for knowledge. I don't believe that need even exists. There is a need to understand, and you don't need knowledge for that. The hypothesis of God, for instance, gives an incomparably absolute opportunity to understand everything and know absolutely nothing. Give man an extremely simplified system of the world and explain every phenomenon away on the basis of that system. An approach like that doesn't require any knowledge. Just a few memorized formulas plus so-called intuition and so-called common sense."

"Hold on," Noonan said. He finished his beer and set the mug noisily on the table. "Don't get off the track. Let's get back to the subject on hand. Man meets an extraterrestrial creature. How do they find out that they are both rational creatures?"

"I haven't the slightest idea," Valentine said with great pleasure. "Everything I've read on the subject comes down to a vicious circle. If they are capable of making contact, then they are rational. And vice versa; if they are rational, they are capable of contact. And in general: if an extraterrestrial creature has the honor of possessing human psychology, then it is rational. Like that."

"There you go. And I thought you boys had it all laid out in neat cubbyholes."

"A monkey can put things into cubbyholes," Valentine replied.

"No, wait a minute." For some reason, Noonan felt cheated. "If you don't know simple things like that … All right, the hell with reason. Obviously, it's a real quagmire. OK. But what about the Visitation? What do you think about the Visitation?"

"My pleasure. Imagine a picnic." Noonan shuddered.

"What did you say?"

"A picnic. Picture a forest, a country road, a meadow. A car drives , off the country road into the meadow, a group of young people get out of the car carrying bottles, baskets of food, transistor radios, and cameras. They light fires, pitch tents, turn on the music. In the morning they leave. The animals, birds, and insects that watched in horror through the long night creep out from their hiding places. And what do they see? Gas and oil spilled on the grass. Old spark plugs and old filters strewn around. Rags, burnt-out bulbs, and a monkey wrench left behind. Oil slicks on the pond. And of course, the usual mess—apple cores, candy wrappers, charred remains of the campfire, cans, bottles, somebody's handkerchief, somebody's penknife, torn newspapers, coins, faded flowers picked in another meadow."

"I see. A roadside picnic."

"Precisely. A roadside picnic, on some road in the cosmos. And you ask if they will come back."

"Let me have a smoke. Goddamn this pseudoscience! Somehow I imagined it all differently."

"That's your right."

"So does that mean they never even noticed us?"

"Why?"

"Well, anyway, didn't pay any attention to us?"

"You know, I wouldn't be upset if I were you." Noonan inhaled, coughed, and threw away the cigarette.

"I don't care," he said stubbornly. "It can't be. Damn you scientists! Where do you get your contempt for man? Why are you always trying to put mankind down?"

"Wait a minute," Valentine said. "Listen: 'You ask me what makes man great?' " he quoted. " 'That he re-created nature? That he has harnessed cosmic forces? That in a brief time he conquered the planet and opened a window on the universe? No! That, despite all this, he has survived and intends to survive in the future.' "

There was a silence. Noonan was thinking.

"Don't get depressed," Valentine said kindly. "The picnic is my own theory. And not even a theory—just a picture. The serious xenologists are working on much more solid and flattering versions for human vanity. For example, that there has been no Visitation yet, that it is to come. A highly rational culture threw containers with artifacts of its civilization onto Earth. They expect us to study the artifacts, make a giant technological leap, and send a signal in response that will show we are ready for contact. How do you like that one?"

"That's much better," Noonan said. "I see that there are decent people among scientists after all."

"Here's another one. The Visitation has taken place, but it is not over by a long shot. We are in contact even as we speak, but we are not aware of it. The visitors are living in the Zones and carefully observing us and simultaneously preparing us for the 'cruel wonders of the future.' "

"Now that I can understand! At least that explains the mysterious activity in the ruins of the factory. By the way, your picnic doesn't explain it."

"Why doesn't it? One of the girls could have forgotten her favorite wind-up teddy bear on the meadow."

ROADSIDE PICNIC, Arkady Strugatsky, Boris Strugatsky

Balança

O cepticismo é necessário para possibilitar a acumulação coerente de conhecimento. Cepticismo a menos pode levar-nos aos sistemas dogmáticos, edifícios estáveis mas imóveis. Excesso de cepticismo leva-nos ao niilismo, o que não serve de telhado quando começa a chover.

Metáforas

Citações retiradas do livro Metaphors we live by (1981) por George Lakoff e Mark Johnson, sobre a importância da metáfora não só na linguagem, mas no aparelho cognitivo humano.

"The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. [...] The most important claim [...] is that metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical. This is what we mean when we say that the human conceptual system is metaphorically structured and defined. Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system.

[Chapter 6]

Just as the basic experiences of human spatial orientations give rise to orientational metaphors, so our experiences with physical objects (especially our own bodies) provide the basis for an extraordinarily wide variety of ontological metaphors, that is, ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances. [...] Ontological metaphors are necessary for even attempting to deal rationally with our experiences.

The range of ontological metaphors that we use for such purposes is enormous. [...] Ontological metaphors like [THE MIND IS A MACHINE] are so natural and so pervasive in our thought that they are usually taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena. The fact that they are metaphorical never occurs to most of us. We take statements like "He cracked under pressure" as being directly true or false. [...] We use ontological metaphors to comprehend events, actions, activities, and states. Events and actions are conceptualized metaphorically as objects, activities as substances, states as containers.

[Chapter 7]

Perhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person. This allows us to comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities. [...] personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors, each picking out different aspects of a person or ways of looking at a person. What they all have in common is that they are extensions of ontological metaphors and that they allow us to make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms—terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics.

[Chapter 19]

metaphor pervades our normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time, etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientations, objects, etc.). This need leads to metaphorical definition in our conceptual system.

Acumulação

A redundância é necessária para evitar a acumulação de erros. Um sistema sem redundância é eficiente mas instável. Excesso de redundância leva-nos ao pavor da burocracia.

Abuso

As figuras de estilo são abusos de linguagem. Mas sem esses abusos, as pontes que nos ligam aos outros e às coisas seriam impossíveis. A boa educação, no limite, é insustentável.

Efeito corrosivo

"One of the worst things about breaking the law is that it puts one at odds with an indeterminate number of other people. This is among the many corrosive effects of having unjust laws: They tempt peaceful and (otherwise) honest people to lie so as to avoid being punished for behavior that is ethically blameless." Sam Harris, Lying

Ponte

Existe uma relação - dinâmica, complexa, intermitente - entre o sistema nervoso humano e a realidade que o limita. A esta relação chamamos 'eu'.

Incrível

Rendering Synthetic Objects into Legacy Photographs from Kevin Karsch on Vimeo.

Guilherme de Ockham

Ockham [...] deplored the inaccuracy of the terms used in philosophy, and spent half his time trying to make them more precise. He resented the Gothic edifice of abstractions- one mounted upon the other like arches in superimposed tiers- that medieval thought had raised. We cannot find in his extant works precisely the famous formula that tradition called "Ockham's razor": entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem - entities are not to be multiplied beyond need. But he expressed the principle in other terms again and again: pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate - a plurality (of entities or causes or factors) is not to be posited (or assumed) without necessity; and frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora - it is vain to seek to accomplish or explain by assuming several entities or causes what can be explained by fewer.

The principle was not new; Aquinas had accepted it, Scotus had used it. But in Ockham's hands it became a deadly weapon, cutting away a hundred occult fancies and grandiose abstractions. Applying the principle to epistemology, Ockham judged it needless to assume, as the source and material of knowledge, anything more than sensations. From these arise memory (sensation revived), perception (sensation interpreted through memory), imagination (memories combined), anticipation (memory projected), thought (memories compared), and experience (memories interpreted through thought). "Nothing can be an object of the interior sense" (thought) "without having been an object of the exterior sense" (sensation); here is Locke's empiricism 300 years before Locke.

All that we ever perceive outside ourselves is individual entities- specific persons, places, things, actions, shapes, colors, tastes, odors, pressures, temperatures, sounds; and the words by which we denote these are "words of first intention" or primary intent, directly referring to what we interpret as external realities. By noting and abstracting the common features of similar entities so perceived, we may arrive at general or abstract ideas- man, virtue, height, sweetness, heat, music, eloquence; and the words by which we denote such abstractions are "words of second intention," referring to conceptions derived from perceptions. These "universals" are never experienced in sensation; they are termini, signa, nomina - terms, signs, names - for generalizations extremely useful (and dangerous) in thought or reason, in science, philosophy, and theology; they are not objects existing outside the mind. "Everything outside the mind is singular, numerically one."

Reason is magnificent, but its conclusions have meaning only in so far as they refer to experience- i.e., to the perception of individual entities, or the performance of individual acts; otherwise its conclusions are vain and perhaps deceptive abstractions. How much nonsense is talked or written by mistaking ideas for things, abstractions for realities! Abstract thought fulfills its function only when it leads to specific statements about specific things. From this "nominalism" Ockham moved with devastating recklessness into every field of philosophy and theology. Both metaphysics and science, he announced, are precarious generalizations, since our experience is only of individual entities in a narrowly restricted area and time; it is mere arrogance on our part to assume the universal and eternal validity of the general propositions and "natural laws" that we derive from this tiny sector of reality. Our knowledge is molded and limited by our means and ways of perceiving things (this is Kant before Kant); it is locked up in the prison of our minds, and it must not pretend to be the objective or ultimate truth about anything.

Will Durant - Story of Civilization, vol.06, pp.246-49

Liberalismo

"[Liberalism is] a philosophy that champions the right of individuals – regardless of rank or creed or color – to be free of the choking grip of enforced traditionalism, free of the stupidity of superstition (including the hyper-lethal superstition that is nationalism), and free of the arbitrary will of their ‘betters.’

Classical liberals (and many “conservatives”) champion free markets and private property rights, therefore, not to defend “elite privileges against challenges from below” but out of a sincere conviction that markets and property are necessary for maximum possible freedom and for astonishing material abundance." Don Boudreaux

Pandemónio

(c) Oatmeal [via Aurea Mediocritas]

the only question that really matters

"Apparently praying keeps her calm and happy. It's some kind of ritual for them. It doesn't do any harm. Why don't you go and join them if you're worried?"

Theo said: "I don't think they'd want me."

"I don't know, they might. They might try to convert you. Are you a Christian?"

"No, I'm not a Christian."

"What do you believe, then?"

"Believe about what?"

"The things that religious people think are important. Whether there is a God. How do you explain evil? What happens when we die? Why are we here? How ought we to live our lives?"

Theo said: "The last is the most important, the only question that really matters. You don't have to be religious to believe that. And you don't have to be a Christian to find an answer."

Rolf turned to him and asked, as if he really wanted to know: "But what do you believe? I don't just mean religion. What are you sure of?"

"That once I was not and that now I am. That one day I shall no longer be."

Rolf gave a short laugh, harsh as a shout. "That's safe enough. No one can argue with that. What does he believe, the Warden of England?"

"I don't know. We never discussed it."

Miriam came over and, sitting with her back against a trunk, stretched out her legs wide, closed her eyes and lifted her face, gently smiling, to the sky, listening but not speaking.

Rolf said: "I used to believe in God and the Devil and then one morning, when I was twelve, I lost my faith. I woke up and found that I didn't believe in any of the things the Christian Brothers had taught me. I thought if that ever happened I'd be too frightened to go on living, but it didn't make any difference. One night I went to bed believing and the next morning I woke up unbelieving. I couldn't even tell God I was sorry, because He wasn't there any more. And yet it didn't really matter. It hasn't mattered ever since."

Miriam said without opening her eyes: "What did you put in His empty place?''

"There wasn't any empty place. That's what I'm telling you."

P.D.James, The Children of Men

Corte

Como na separação da Igreja e do Estado, precisamos da separação das Corporações e do Estado.

Navalha

O conceito de deus inclui um método de explicação do mundo natural (e.g., os mitos da criação). Este método nunca pode ser reconciliado com as metodologias actuais, designadas genericamente por método científico. Se um evento for observado repetidamente e que não possui explicação ou predição possível nas teorias científicas correntes, a única explicação científica para este facto é admitir que essas teorias são incompletas e precisam de reforma ou, raramente, de substituição. Não existe espaço para complementar estes modelos com um deus ex machina. Este argumento é, na essência, baseado na indução de séculos de acumulação de conhecimento científico onde cada evento interpretado como mágico e misterioso ou se encontrou um modelo científico (e.g., a electricidade, as ervas curativas) ou foi eliminado por testes e experiências controladas (e.g., os fantasmas, a premonição). Não existem contra-exemplos desta tendência.

Contra-exemplos

"The following kind of scenario is familiar throughout analytic philosophy. A bold philosopher proposes that all Fs are Gs. Another philosopher proposes a particular case that is, intuitively, an F but not a G. If intuition is right, then the bold philosopher is mistaken. Alternatively, if the bold philosopher is right, then intuition is mistaken, and we have learned something from philosophy. Can this alternative ever be realised, and if so, is there a way to tell when it is? In this paper, I will argue that the answer to the first question is yes, and that recognising the right answer to the second question should lead to a change in some of our philosophical practices.

The problem is pressing because there is no agreement across the sub-disciplines of philosophy about what to do when theory and intuition clash. In epistemology, particularly in the theory of knowledge, and in parts of metaphysics, particularly in the theory of causation, it is almost universally assumed that intuition trumps theory. [...] I claim that it is (usually) the epistemologists and the metaphysicians who are wrong. In more cases than we usually imagine, a good philosophical theory can teach us that our intuitions are mistaken. Indeed, I think it is possible (although perhaps not likely) that the justified true belief (hereafter, JTB) theory of knowledge is so plausible that we should hold onto it in preference to keeping our intuition that Gettier cases are not cases of knowledge.

[...]

In short, the true theory of knowledge is the one that does best at (a) accounting for as many as possible of our intuitions about knowledge while (b) remaining systematic. A ‘theory’ that simply lists our intuitions is no theory at all, so condition (b) is vital. [...] counterexamples to a theory count against it. While a theory can be reformist, it cannot be revolutionary. A theory that disagreed with virtually all intuitions about possible cases is, for that reason, false. The theory: X knows that p iff X exists and p is true is systematic, but hardly plausible. As a corollary, while intuitions about any particular possible case can be mistaken, not too many of them could be. Counterexamples are problematic for a theory, the fewer reforms needed the better, it’s just not that they are not fatal. Importantly, not all counterexamples are as damaging to a theory as others. Intuitions come in various degrees of strength, and theories that violate weaker intuitions are not as badly off as those that violate stronger intuitions. Many people accept that the more obscure or fantastic a counterexample is, the less damaging it is to a theory." - Brian Weatherson, What good are counterexamples (2003)

Gestão

As pessoas são livres mas exercem a sua liberdade e as suas capacidades dentro da sociedade e da cultura a que pertencem. O possível e o admissível são contingentes e limitados por muitas direcções, como pela geografia, pela história ou pela cognição humana. Estudar disciplinas que gerem o finito, como a Ética ou a Economia, é um passo importante para lidar com a frustração do limite.

Passos vs. Saltos

Uma teoria científica não pode ir contra demasiados factos relevantes ao seu domínio de aplicação. Uma teoria filosófica não pode ir contra demasiadas intuições sobre o assunto em questão. Como diz Weatherson [1] uma teoria filosófica pode ser reformista mas não pode ser revolucionária. Mas as teorias podem ser usadas para remodelar a cultura e, assim, as intuições das pessoas que nela habitam. Por exemplo, a ideia de democracia, de ser o povo e não uma elite, a escolher qual a política de uma nação era ainda há pouco tempo uma ideia muito pouco intuitiva. Com esta mudança abrem-se as portas a novas teorias que no passado seriam consideradas revolucionárias mas que, agora, apenas procuram uma nova reforma.

[1] Brian Weatherson, What good are counterexamples (2003)

Tons de Cinzento

"When people thought the earth was flat, they were wrong. When people thought the earth was spherical, they were wrong. But if you think that thinking the earth is spherical is just as wrong as thinking the earth is flat, then your view is wronger than both of them put together." The Relativity of Wrong, Isaac Asimov

The Sophisticate: The world isn't black and white. No one does pure good or pure bad. It's all gray. Therefore, no one is better than anyone else.
The Zetet: Knowing only gray, you conclude that all grays are the same shade. You mock the simplicity of the two-color view, yet you replace it with a one-color view... - David's Sling, Marc Stiegler

Definições

Conceitos como o livre-arbítrio ou o conhecimento têm sido motivo de discussões filosóficas desde a Grécia Antiga. Qualquer um que tente uma definição sobre um destes temas encontra rapidamente, na comunidade filosófica, argumentos e contra-exemplos igualmente sólidos

O caso de conhecimento é exemplar. Ao fim de inúmeras discussões parecia que a comunidade intelectual tinha chegado a um acordo sobre a definição de conhecimento: a pessoa A conhece B se A acredita em B, A tem uma justificação para acreditar em B e B é verdadeiro, ou simplesmente, algo é conhecimento se é uma crença justificada e verdadeira. Mas chega 1963 e Edmund Gettier publica um breve artigo (e o seu único, curiosamente) que apresenta contra-exemplos suficientemente convincentes para voltar a pôr a questão do conhecimento na ordem do dia [1]. Cinquenta anos passados e, tanto quanto sei, ainda não se alcançou um novo consenso (deve-se apertar ou relaxar a definição inicial? O que é justificação? E, já que falamos disto, o que é uma crença?).

Outro tipo de efeito é o que ocorre actualmente com o livre-arbítrio. Com os avanços científicos no estudo do cérebro e do comportamento, tem-se testemunhado a uma confusão sobre o que significa. Quando se recolhem evidências que vão contra uma definição, existe um esforço para ajustá-la até que deixe de ser testável (na maior parte das vezes de forma inconsciente, sendo algumas motivadas ideologicamente, e.g., pela noção cristã da alma). Poderíamos talvez sugerir a seguinte pré-condição à definição de livre-arbítrio: «algo suficientemente vago sobre a capacidade de decisão individual que não possa ser contestado por neurociêntistas e psicólogos». O mesmo parece ocorrer com outras definições cognitivas, como a consciência ou a inteligência ou até o comportamento moral, persistindo como o bastião último que nos separa do restante reino animal.

Existe algo fugidio sobre o problema das definições, sobre o mapear de um conceito abstracto a múltiplas situações concretas. Pergunto-me se palavras como 'tristeza' ou 'gigante' tivessem, por algum motivo histórico ou social, recolhido a mesma atenção, se não estaríamos também a discuti-los e a publicar artigos e livros sobre o assunto. Se, por um lado, as definições possuem um papel na resolução de questões epistemológicas [2], levar esse papel ao limite (da precisão, da exaustão dos casos conhecidos) pode ter um efeito paralizante sobre a discussão filosófica ou científica.

Que se evite definições demasiado vagas ou excessivamente restritas para o problema em questão. Mas encontrar a definição quase perfeita, que englobe todos os casos possíveis e imaginários (como muitos dos contra-exemplos propostos) é ilusório. Devemos investir numa definição apropriada, incompleta sim mas cujas falhas conhecemos, com a qual podemos sincronizar o mapa semântico da comunidade de interessados e realizar trabalho.

Um exemplo recente foi a despromoção de Plutão de planeta para planetóide. A descoberta de vários objectos trans-neptunianos levou à redefinição de planeta. Agora, um planeta é um objecto suficientemente grande para a gravidade o tornar esférico e capaz de limpar a órbita que o limita de planetesimais. Significa isto que se descobrirmos objectos que acompanham a órbita da Terra (e de facto, descobrimos alguns em 2010) a Terra deixa de ser um planeta? Só se exigirmos a rigidez de uma definição exacta que de nada serve porque (quase) nada é representado por ela.

[1] O artigo de Gettier: http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html

[2] Uma definição de definição: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/

Justificações Post-Hoc

"Humans are very good as seeing patterns, making connections, and coming up with explanations for phenomena. Almost anything can be explained in retrospect, and it only takes a couple of apparent connections to make such explanations seem compelling. That is actually the fatal flaw of such post-hoc reasoning – it can be used to explain anything. Therefore, the fact that someone can invent a post-hoc justification is not predictive that the explanation is actually true. In other words – we tend to be naively impressed with the fact that an explanation is available. We tend to assume that a phenomenon would not have an explanation, or alternative explanation, if that explanation were not true. We therefore find it satisfying, and therefore compelling, when such an explanation is available. However, the human capacity for invention and pattern seeking is profound. We can find an explanation for anything – and so the availability of such an explanation should not be compelling at all." - Juicy Post-Hoc Reasoning, Steven Novella

O impacto progressivamente desastroso das patentes

"The way the US patent system is currently set up, it’s difficult if not impossible to write a sizable body of code without unknowingly infringing on somebody’s patent. Your best hope seems to be to waste a lot of time filing as many patents as you can of your own, and hoping that anybody who sues you is unknowingly infringing on one of yours. That gives you a bargaining chip so you can do some kind of cross licensing deal. It’s a stupid, wasteful, unproductive government-created system that achieves the exact opposite of what was intended when it was first started. But, what can you do." - Ed Burnette

Encontrei este parágrafo enquanto procurava descobrir porque o sistema Android (implementado, em parte, em Java) não executa aplicações Java. A Oracle comprou a Sun (que desenvolveu o Java para ser uma linguagem de programação livre) e quer espremer todos os lucros que conseguir. Ainda no mês passado, a Google viu-se obrigada a gastar 12G$ na compra da Motorola Mobile para ter acesso às respectivas patentes e assim evitar ataques da Microsoft e companhia. Doze mil milhões de dólares que poderiam ter sido gastos em investigação e actividades economicamente produtivas. Até quando vamos ter de aguentar esta palhaçada?

Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?

David Hume provided the classical statement of the view that moral values are the product of certain natural human desires. Hume argued that human behaviour is a product of passion and reason. Passions set the ends or goals of action; and reason works out the best available means of achieving these ends. Under this view, passions determine what humans find agreeable, desirable and valuable. Values are projected onto the world of objects and events by the passions in much the same way that colors are projected onto the world by the visual system. For this reason, Hume is said to have a subjectivist or projectivist theory of value. Whereas Hobbes argued that natural human passions were entirely selfish and that morality was an artificial invention, Hume argued that human nature included some passions – such as familial affection, sexual fidelity, sympathy and pride -- that promoted the common good. Hume called these moral passions, and argued that they constituted the basis of human morality.

[...] Although Hume’s theory is primarily a meta-ethical account of the nature and ontological status of morality, it segues into normative or substantive ethics in the following way. The ends supplied by the passions provide the first premises of chains of means-end reasoning. [...] It follows from this view of human psychology – and in particular, from this instrumentalist account of reason – that, in the absence of any passions, desires, or ends, reason alone cannot tell you what you ought to do. [...] one cannot go on justifying statements forever, one must come to a stop somewhere. And where one comes to a stop constitutes one’s meta-ethical theory. Theologians stop at divine commands, relativists stop at social conventions, Humeans stop at certain passions.

[...] The Humean-Darwinian argues that humans are equipped with a suite of adaptations for cooperation, that these adaptations constitute what have been called the moral passions or moral sentiments, and that these adaptations determine what people deem morally good and bad. If one accepts this argument, it makes no sense to complain that evolution may have explained why humans find certain things morally good, but it cannot tell us whether these things are really morally good or not. It follows from the premises of the argument that there is no criterion of ‘moral goodness’ independent of human psychology, and hence this question cannot arise.

Oliver Curry, Who’s Afraid of the Naturalistic Fallacy?, Evolutionary Psychology, 2006. 4: 234-247 [pdf]

Math Doodling

Vi Hart - Mathemusician

Domínio

Nem tudo é política. Existe um domínio do privado que faz parte dos direitos fundamentais e que a gestão da coisa pública não tem jurisdição.

Nem tudo é ética. Se o fosse, como respeitar o princípio da imparcialidade no que toca ao irredutível dos nossos filhos?